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Abstract 
With the expansion of renewable energy sources (RES) in countries all over the world, policy 
design to address the negative impacts of RES plants on their local and regional environment 
gains in importance. We analyse whether policy design should be spatially-differentiated or 
uniform when negative RES environmental externalities are spatially heterogeneous and dis­
play interregional cumulative effects. In a theoretical model of the RES electricity generation 
sector, we compare the welfare differential between both regulatory designs and analyse how 
it is affected by cumulative environmental effects. While we confirm that the welfare costs of 
attaining a RES deployment target are lower under a spatially-differentiated than a spatially­
uniform regulation, we find that the welfare costs are contingent on the presence of cumulative 
environmental effects. This depends on the heterogeneity of region-specific generation cost 
parameters and social cost parameters of RES electricity generation. If heterogeneity is more 
(less) pronounced in regional generation cost parameters than in regional social cost parame­
ters, positive (negative) cumulative effects decrease the welfare costs of a uniform instrument. 
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1 Introduction 
Fostering renewable energy sources (RES) for electricity generation has been one of the crucial 
steps of governments all over the world to address the problem of climate change. By reducing 
CO2 emissions in the power sector, RES are known as sustainable alternative for electricity 
generation as compared to conventional electricity generation technologies (Evans et al., 2009; 
Sims et al., 2003). However, at a local or regional scale, RES also exhibit negative effects on the 
environment (Zerrahn, 2017; Dai et al., 2015; Tsoutsos et al., 2005). The occurrence and extent 
of these externalities are spatially heterogeneous, i.e. highly dependant on local and regional 
characteristics of generation sites. For example, wind power plants onshore are frequently asso­
ciated with a decline in scenic beauty or with negative effects on wind power sensitive bird and 
bat species (Zerrahn, 2017; Mattmann et al., 2016). Yet, the actual level of intrusion depends 
on landscape characteristics or the type of bird and bat habitats (Molnarova et al., 2012; Hötker 
et al., 2006; Drewitt and Langston, 2006). From an interregional perspective, RES generation in 
several regions can additionally cause cumulative effects on the environment. Marginal environ­
mental damages of RES electricity generation in one region then also depend on RES electricity 
generation in another region. For example, the regional disturbance caused by wind turbines to 
bird populations depends on both, the type of habitat the plants are sited in and the availability 
of alternative habitat in adjacent regions (Drewitt and Langston, 2006). If birds can migrate to 
alternative habitats, they may avoid the disturbance caused by wind turbines in their original 
habitat. This option does not exist if alternative habitats are also disturbed by wind turbines 
(Gill et al., 2001). Thus, marginal damages of installing wind power plants in one habitat depend 
on whether turbines are also installed in alternative habitats. Another example for cumulative 
environmental effects with respect to RES deployment is the presence of fairness preferences, 
which account for the fact that people might resist inequitable outcomes of allocation processes 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr et al., 2006). In the context of RES deployment, fairness pref­
erences at a spatial scale capture the fact that how strongly residents perceive negative effects 
of wind turbines on e.g. scenic beauty in their region may also depend on how evenly wind 
turbines and the related environmental damages are distributed across regions (Lehmann et al., 
2020; Drechsler et al., 2017; Langer et al., 2016). 
Consequently, managing the negative environmental effects of RES deployment entails two reg­
ulatory challenges that emerge from the externality characteristics of spatial heterogeneity and 
cumulative effects on the environment. In this paper, we analyse how these two characteris­
tics may affect the optimal design of policies to support RES deployment. While RES support 
policies usually vary between RES technologies, technology-specific policies are mostly uniform. 
Exceptions include variations according to spatial differences in solar and wind resources or 
power system costs (del Ŕıo, 2017). However, payment schemes mostly do not account for 
location-specific environmental externalities. In Germany, for example, support payments for 
larger RES projects are defined in national auctions. Payments are mostly differentiated ac­
cording to production technologies, such as wind onshore and offshore, solar PV and biomass. 
Spatially varying components are considered with respect to wind yield or the geographical lo­
cation of plants in the northern or southern regions of Germany (EEG 2021). The inclusion of 
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spatially-heterogeneous environmental costs in the price signal for further RES expansion may 
hold significant potential for welfare improvements. Yet, it may also be associated with higher 
transaction costs of policy design (Lehmann, 2013). 
Against this background, we analyse the performance of spatially-differentiated and spatially­
uniform policy designs for the regulation of RES expansion in the presence of complex spatial 
externalities. We apply a theoretical partial equilibrium model of the RES electricity sector and 
compare the welfare outcomes of a spatially-differentiated and a uniform subsidy. We aim at 
understanding the size of potential welfare differences and at identifying the parameters that 
may drive these differences. 
Standard insights from spatial environmental economics suggest that, under perfect informa­
tion, spatially differentiated policies are always preferable over uniform instruments to regulate 
site-specific environmental externalities (Tietenberg, 1978; Kolstad, 1987). Tietenberg (1978, 
1995) argues that spatially differentiated emission charges reach air pollution targets from non­
uniformly mixed pollutants at lowest cost, while their uniform counterpart is accompanied by a 
significant welfare loss. Kolstad (1987) finds that the welfare loss of regulating a spatially het­
erogeneous pollutant with a uniform instrument is growing in the steepness of marginal benefit 
and cost functions. In a more recent study, Fowlie and Muller (2019) argue that this rule for 
optimal policy design may be challenged in a second-best setting with informational constraints. 
They show that a spatially-uniform emission trading scheme ex post dominates a spatially­
differentiated trading design in terms of welfare if the policy maker sufficiently underestimates 
firm’s spatially heterogeneous abatement costs ex ante. However, from an ex ante perspective, 
the dominance of the spatially-differentiated regulation is unaltered. 
Yet, these studies do not analyse how cumulative effects on the environment may affect this 
policy evaluation. The literature on the regulation of cumulative effects mainly deals with the 
interaction of pollutants in abatement costs or environmental damages. Respective findings 
suggest that optimal and second-best policy design depend on both, the type of interaction, i.e. 
whether pollutants are complements or substitutes in abatement cost (Stranlund and Son, 2019; 
Crago and Stranlund, 2015; Ambec and Coria, 2013; Caplan, 2006; Moslener and Requate, 2007) 
or environmental damage production (Ambec and Coria, 2013), and on the level of interaction. 
However, the simultaneous existence of cumulative effects and spatially varying environmental 
externalities is not examined in these contributions. 
To our knowledge, the only paper so far which extends the analysis to environmental dam­
ages that display both spatial heterogeneity and cumulative effects is the study of payments for 
biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures by Waetzold and Drechsler (2005). For the comparison 
of spatially-differing and uniform payments, they model cumulative environmental benefits as 
the product of regional environmental benefits from biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures. 
Their results support the finding that uniform instrument design may bring about substantial 
welfare losses as compared to differentiated policies. Further, Waetzold and Drechsler (2005) 
show that, when cumulative benefits are taken into account, the welfare losses of uniform in­
struments are lowest if costs and benefits are correlated negatively across regions. 
In contrast to Waetzold and Drechsler (2005), we consider cumulative environmental effects as 
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an additional component to aggregate environmental damages. We thereby include both en­
vironmental externalities from regional and interregional RES deployment. Furthermore, we 
allow for cumulative effects to either increase or decrease aggregate environmental damages. 
Our findings show that spatially differentiated instruments continue to welfare-dominate spa­
tially uniform regulations if environmental externalities vary at a spatial level and cumulative 
environmental effects occur. Further, we find that the impact of cumulative environmental ef­
fects on the welfare costs of a uniform regulation primarily depends on the heterogeneity of 
region-specific generation cost and social cost parameters and on the size and direction of cumu­
lative effects. We define region-specific social cost parameters as the sum of regional generation 
cost and environmental damage parameters. If the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters 
is stronger than in social cost parameters, negative cumulative environmental effects increase the 
welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated and uniform instrument. However, positive 
cumulative effects may reduce the welfare differential, if they are not too strong. It is therefore 
necessary to consider cumulative effects for policy design choices. While spatially-differentiated 
instruments result in the socially-optimal spatial allocation of electricity generation, they are 
also associated with high transaction costs (Lehmann, 2012; Coggan et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
welfare gains of spatially-differentiating instrument design, i.e. the welfare differential between 
spatially-differentiated and uniform instruments, may vanish, when transaction costs are also 
taken into account. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the theoretical model and the 
policy options we subsequently analyse. In Section 3, we show the socially optimal spatial al­
location of electricity generation. In Section 4, we derive the spatial allocation of electricity 
generation for the different policy designs and analyse the corresponding welfare costs as well 
as the welfare differential. In Section 5, the theoretical model is calibrated for an empirical 
example. In Section 6, we discuss our findings and conclude in the final section of the paper. 
2 Model 
Our model represents the RES sub-sector of the electricity generation market. We thereby ab­
stract from any non-renewable sources for electricity generation. A regulator seeks to attain an 
external RES electricity generation target by implementing a subsidy for electricity generated by 
renewable energies. Given the subsidy level, a private investor decides on electricity generation. 
RES deployment can take place in two regions and is associated with two types of costs: gener­
ation costs that accrue during the process of electricity generation and environmental damages 
that occur as negative externalities of the generation process. 
2.1 Generation costs and environmental externalities 
Electricity generation costs vary between the two regions i and j: 
ci
Ci(xi) = xi 
2 , with ci > 0 (1)
2 
where Cj (xj ) is analogous except that cj > 0 is larger or smaller than ci. Region-specific costs 
are increasing and convex in regional electricity generation xi and xj , respectively. Convexity of 
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region-specific costs is based on the heterogeneity of plant site quality within a region. To en­
hance regional RES electricity generation, it is necessary to increase the number of power plants. 
Since the quality of potential plant sites within a region varies depending on natural conditions 
for RES electricity generation, such as wind yield or solar radiation, additional power plants are 
sited at locations with increasingly less favourable natural conditions. Fixed generation costs 
per plant, such as investment, installation, operating and maintenance costs (Kost et al., 2018; 
Ueckerdt et al., 2013), are then allocated across lower levels of average electricity generation 
per plant. Thus, in our model, region-specific marginal generation costs linearly increase with 
the factor ci or cj . Naturally, physical conditions for electricity yield may also significantly vary 
between regions. Therefore, ci varies across regions, manifesting the spatial heterogeneity of 
generation costs, ci  = cj (Kost et al., 2018; Borenstein, 2012). 
The second type of costs caused by RES electricity generation are negative environmental exter­
nalities. We assume a simplified environmental damage function that is composed of additively 
connected spatial features: 
di 2 dj 2D(xi, xj ) = xi + xj + kxixj with di, dj > 0, di = dj , k  (2) = 0,
2 2 
The first and second term in equation (2) represent environmental damages that arise due to 
region-specific electricity generation xi in region i and xj in region j, respectively. Similar to 
generation costs, environmental damages from region-specific electricity generation depend on 
spatial characteristics that vary across regions. For example, wind turbines onshore may harm 
regional bird or bat species that are sensitive to power plants. The turbines can pose a risk of 
collision for individual animals or cause displacement effects that potentially result in habitat 
loss (Drewitt and Langston, 2006). The severity of these effects varies with specifications of 
other local or regional factors, such as distance to the aerie or habitat use and habitat quality 
(Schuster et al., 2015; Hötker et al., 2006; Drewitt and Langston, 2006). Similarly, large scale 
PV systems and onshore wind power plants can negatively affect the quality of their surround­
ing landscape (Botelho et al., 2017; Meyerhoff et al., 2010). The extent of this effect depends 
on regional landscape features such as elevation or the level of scenic quality. E.g., Molnarova 
et al. (2012) find that siting wind turbines in mountainous regions with many natural elements 
has a higher negative effect on scenic beauty than in lowland agricultural areas. In our model, 
the level of spatial heterogeneity in environmental damages is captured by diverging regional 
damage parameters di and dj . 
The third term in equation (2) comprises cumulative environmental effects of electricity genera­
tion that emerge if generation takes place in more than one region. This captures the fact that 
marginal environmental damages from electricity generation in region i depend on electricity 
∂D generation in region j, ∂xi = dixi + kxj , and vice versa. The corresponding cross-derivative is 
∂2Dthus equal to the cumulative impact factor, = k.∂xi∂xj 
If cumulative effects are positive, expressed by k > 0, aggregate environmental damages increase 
if electricity is generated in both regions. On the contrary, negative cumulative effects, expressed 
by k < 0, decrease aggregate environmental damages if RES electricity generation takes place 
in both regions. Thus, aggregate environmental damages are increased by positive cumulative 




amples that depend on the environmental externality of interest. 
For example, the impact of onshore wind turbines on regional bird populations not only depends 
on regional factors, such as habitat quality, but also on the availability of suitable alternative 
habitat in adjacent regions. If birds are disturbed by wind power developments in their habitat, 
they may migrate to alternative suitable habitats. However, if wind power development takes 
place in these habitats as well, this option can be lost. The birds may then need to remain in 
their original habitat and face reduced survival probabilities or diminishing reproductive success 
(Drewitt and Langston, 2006; Gill et al., 2001). In our model, this would be depicted by k > 0, 
indicating positive cumulative environmental effects. 
A second example is the impact of wind turbines on landscape quality. In this context, cumu­
lative environmental effects may arise due to fairness preferences at a spatial scale (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Fehr et al., 2006). That is, preferences regarding the spatially even or uneven de­
ployment of wind power plants (Sasse and Trutnevyte, 2019; Jenkins et al., 2016). If a spatially 
more balanced allocation of wind turbines is favoured (Lehmann et al., 2020; Drechsler et al., 
2017; Langer et al., 2016), deploying wind turbines in more than one region reduces aggregate 
damages from wind power plants to the landscape. That is, people perceive wind power plants 
as less harmful to scenery if damages to the landscape are distributed across regions. In this 
example, cumulative environmental effects are negative, expressed by k < 0. 
2.2 Policy Options 
The regulator is assumed to be benevolent and perfectly informed about both generation costs 
and environmental damages associated with RES electricity generation. The regulator pursues 
¯the exogenous supraregional RES electricity generation target X. This is a popular measure 
by governments to promote RES development, mostly in terms of quantity or percentage tar­
gets (IRENA, 2020). We further assume that regional electricity generation xi, xj is perfectly 
substitutable in reaching the generation target: 
¯ ¯xi + xj ≥ X, with 0 ≤ xi, xj and X > 0 
The actual level of regional electricity generation is determined by a private investor who max­
imises interregional profits. To incentivize private investment in RES electricity generation, the 
regulator implements a per-unit subsidy s for electricity generated by renewable sources. The 
subsidy may either be spatially-differentiated (si = sj ) or spatially-uniform (si = sj = s). 
The welfare outcomes of both regulatory designs are compared and the corresponding welfare 
differential is analysed with a focus on the impact of cumulative environmental effects. 
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3 Social optimum 
Before the regulation schemes are examined, we first determine the efficient spatial allocation 
of electricity generation. In the social optimum, RES electricity generation is allocated across 
¯regions such that the social costs of reaching the generation target X are minimised: 
¯min SC = Ci(xi) + Cj (xj ) + D(xi, xj ) s.t. xi + xj ≥ X, (3) 
xi,xj 
xi ≥ 0 
The problem is solved by forming the Lagrangian of (3) and taking the derivates with respect to 
xi, xj and the Lagrange multiplier λ (see Appendix A). The corresponding first-order conditions 
for an inner solution call for equating marginal costs of electricity generation across regions: 
(ci + di)xi + kxj = (cj + dj )xj + kxi 
∗ ∗¯Inserting the quantity constraint for X reaches the socially optimal allocation xi , x j : 
¯ ¯X(cj + dj − k) X(ci + di − k)∗ ∗ x = , x = , (4)i ci + di + cj + dj − 2k j ci + di + cj + dj − 2k 
∗ ∗The solution xi , x only represents the minimum of the social cost function if cumulative en­j
 
ci+di+cj +dj
vironmental effects are lower than α = 2 (refer to Appendix A for the corresponding 
bordered Hessian matrix). Otherwise, that is if k > α, the social cost function is concave and 
∗ ∗ xi , x indicates the maximum of social electricity generation costs. In this case, it is optimal j 
to implement a corner solution. Electricity generation then exclusively takes place in the re­
gion with lower generation cost and environmental damage parameters. Therefore, cumulative 
environmental effects do not emerge at the social optimum in this case. Similarly, cumulative 
environmental effects from electricity generation do not emerge if a corner solution is optimal 
and social costs are convex, i.e. if k < α. This is the case if the level of cumulative effects k is 
higher than the sum of region-specific generation cost and environmental damage parameters in 
either region. Then, optimal electricity generation in the region with higher generation cost and 
environmental damage parameters would be negative for an inner solution (4). Since this is not 
possible, a corner solution in the region with lower generation cost and environmental damage 
parameters is optimal. 
∗ ∗For an inner solution, it follows from (4) that first-best generation levels xi , x j are higher (lower) 
in the region with lower (higher) region-specific generation cost and environmental damage pa­
rameters, (ci + di), (cj + dj ). The difference in optimal regional generation levels is higher if 
the heterogeneity in region-specific cost parameters (ci + di), (cj + dj ) is more pronounced. The 
∗ ∗impact of cumulative environmental effects on xi , x j depends on region-specific cost and damage 
parameters (ci + di), (cj + dj ) as well: 
∂x∗ X̄(cj + dj − ci − di) ∂x∗ X̄(ci + di − cj − dj )i j= , = (5)
∂k (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)2 ∂k (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)2 
Increasing (decreasing) cumulative environmental effects raise electricity generation in the region 
with lower (higher) cost and damage parameters. Considering the sign of k this implies that when 
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a positive cumulative effect, k > 0, grows stronger, generation levels are shifted from the region 
with higher cost and damage parameters to the region with lower cost and damage parameters 
in the social optimum. On the contrary, if a negative cumulative impact, k < 0, grows stronger 
(i.e. if it decreases in mathematical terms), the opposite is true. Furthermore, in the optimum, 
¯which region generates a higher share of the target X is determined by the spatial distribution 
of generation cost and damage parameters, independent of cumulative environmental effects k: 
(cj + dj − ci − di)X̄∗ ∗ ∗ xi − xj = Δx =  0 for cj + dj  ci + di ci + di + cj + dj − 2k
Depending on the difference between generation cost and damage parameters across regions, the 
∗sign of Δx is either positive or negative. However, for the assumption of convex social costs 
(k < α), it is independent of the cumulative effect k. Thus, cumulative environmental effects 
can strengthen or weaken regional generation cost and damage advantages, but can never offset 
them. 
¯The minimal social costs of reaching X are derived by inserting first-best regional generation 
∗ ∗levels xi , x j (4) into the social cost function (3): 
X̄2 (ci + di)(cj + dj ) − k2 ¯SC ∗ (ci, cj , di, dj , k, X) = , (6)
2 (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)
4 Policy Scenarios 
To analyse the efficiency of a spatially-differentiated and a spatially-uniform instrument, we 
derive the welfare outcomes of both regulatory designs and subsequently compare them. 
4.1 Spatially-differentiated subsidy 
If the regulator implements a spatially-differentiated subsidy to incentivise electricity generation 
from renewable resources, total subsidy payments to the private investor depend on the spatial 
allocation of electricity generation across regions. Within each region, the subsidy si, sj is 
uniform. The private investor’s profits from RES electricity generation are represented by total 
subsidy payments net of total generation costs. Profits are maximised with respect to region­
specific electricity generation xi, xj : 
max π = sixi + sj xj − Ci(xi) − Cj (xj ) 
xi,xj 
This yields the following first-order conditions: 
xici = si, xj cj = sj 
si sj
xi = , xj = (7) 
ci cj 
The investor produces renewable electricity in each region until marginal generation costs equal 
the regional per-unit subsidy si, sj . 
The socially optimal spatially-differentiated subsidy is derived by inserting the private investor’s 
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first-order conditions (7) into the social cost function (4) and by minimizing with respect to si, sj :   2   2   2   2         ci si cj sj di si dj sj si sj si sj
min SC = + + + + k s.t. + ≥ X̄
si,sj 2 ci 2 cj 2 ci 2 cj ci cj ci cj
si sj 
, ≥ 0 
ci cj 
∗ ∗Solving for the first-best spatially-differentiated subsidies si , s reaches: j 
¯ ¯Xci(cj + dj − k) Xcj (ci + di − k)∗ ∗ s = , s = (8)i (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) j (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) 
In the optimum, the subsidy is higher (lower) in the region with the lower (higher) total of gen­
eration cost and environmental damage parameters. Cumulative environmental effects influence 
the socially-optimal subsidy levels depending on the spatial distribution of generation cost and 
environmental damage parameters: 
∂s∗ ci(cj + dj − ci − di)X̄ ∂s∗ cj (ci + di − cj − dj )X̄i j= , = 
∂k (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)2 ∂k (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)2 
The first-best subsidy level is increased (reduced) by increasing positive cumulative environ­
mental effects, ∂k > 0, in the region with a lower (higher) total of generation cost and damage 
parameters, (ci + di), (cj + dj ). On the contrary, increasingly negative cumulative environmen­
tal effects, ∂k < 0, decrease (increase) the socially optimal subsidy in the region with a lower 
(higher) total of generation cost and damage parameters. 
Inserting optimal spatially-differentiated subsidies (8) into the private investor’s first-order con­
ditions (7) shows that the first-best allocation of electricity generation across regions (4) is 
implemented. Therefore, the social costs of a spatially-differentiated subsidy are minimal and 
equal to the socially optimal level SC∗ (6). 
4.2 Spatially-uniform subsidy 
Instead of spatially-differentiating subsidy design, the regulator may implement a uniform sub­
sidy for RES electricity generation that is equal across regions. Even though, as demonstrated 
above, spatially-differentiated subsidies achieve the efficient outcome, high administrative costs 
of differentiated regulation or legal restricitons may turn this instrument infeasible. 
With a uniform subsidy, the private investor’s optimization problem changes to: 
max π =s(xi + xj ) − Ci(xi) − Cj (xj ), 
xi,xj 
The respective first-order conditions are as follows: 
xici = s, xj cj = s 
s s 
xi = , xj = (9) 
ci cj 
With a uniform subsidy, the private investor increases regional electricity generation until 
marginal generation costs are equal across regions and correspond to the subsid s. Therefore, 
xi, xj in (9) represents the generation-cost-minimal spatial allocation of electricity generation. 
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At this point, regional generation matches the ratio between the uniform subsidy and the region­
specific generation cost parameter.
 
The level of the uniform subsidy is derived by inserting xi, xj from (9) into the quantity target
 
restriction and by subsequently solving for s:
 
s s
X̄ = xi + xj = + 
ci cj 
¯cicj X 
s U =	 (10) 
ci + cj 
Substituting the subsidy sU into the investor’s first-order condition (9) reaches region-specific 
U Uelectricity generation xi , xj : 
¯ ¯cj X	 ciX 
x Ui = , x 
U
j = (11) ci + cj ci + cj 
For a uniform regulation, regional electricity generation is only contingent on regional marginal 
¯generation costs as well as the target X. Thus, the regulator neglects environmental damages 
¯ ¯entirely to focus on reaching the generation target X (10). The share of X generated in region 
i, j is based on the ratio between the generation cost parameter cj , ci and the sum of generation 
cost parameters in both regions ci + cj . Electricity generation is higher (lower) in the region 
with the lower (higher) generation cost parameter. 
Total social costs of reaching the electricity generation target with a uniform subsidy are derived 
U Uby inserting xi , x (11) into the social cost function (3): j 
2 2 2 2X̄2 ci cj + cicj + ci dj + cj di + 2kcicj¯SCU (ci, cj , di, dj , k, X) =	 (12)
2 (ci + cj )2 
4.3	 Welfare differential: spatially-differentiated vs. spatially-uniform sub­
sidy 
The welfare difference between a spatially-differentiated and a uniform regulation is derived by 
subtracting the social costs of a spatially-differentiated subsidy, which are equal to minimal 
social costs (6), from the social costs of a uniform subsidy (12): 
ΔSC = SCU − SC ∗ = 
2 2 2 2X̄2 ci cj + cicj + ci dj + cj di + 2kcicj X̄2 (ci + di)(cj + dj) − k2 
= − = 
2 (ci + cj )2 2 (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) 
X̄2 (ci(dj − k) − cj (di − k))2 
= ,	 (13)
2 (ci + cj )2(ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)
cidj − cj di
ΔSC = 0 ⇒ k = = kA	 (14) 
ci − cj 
For the assumption of convex social costs (i.e. k < α), the welfare differential is always greater 
than or equal to zero. The latter is true if cumulative effects are equal to kA (14). In this case, 
a spatially-uniform subsidy is efficient, such that regional electricity generation is identical for 
the two regulatory designs: 
¯cidj − cj di	 cicjX∗ ∗ U	 ∗ U ∗ Ufor k = kA =	 ⇒ s = s = s = ⇒ x = xi , x = xi j	 i j jci − cj	 (ci + cj ) 
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Therefore, governing RES deployment with a uniform instrument is always more costly than – 
or as costly as – with a spatially-differentiated policy. This basic result confirms the findings of 
the literature: it remains efficient to manage spatially-heterogeneous environmental effects with 
spatially-differentiated policies even in the presence of interregional cumulative environmental 
effects. 
However, the existence of the cumulative effect k on the environment may reduce or enhance 
the welfare differential ΔSC1: 
∂ΔSC kX̄2(ci + di − cj − dj )2 kX̄2(ci + di − cj − dj )2 
= − + + 
∂k ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)3 ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)3 _    
=0 
cicj X̄
2 X̄2(ci + di − k)(cj + dj − k)
+ − 
(ci + cj )2 (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)2 _    
U U ∗ ∗ =x x −xi xji j 
∂ΔSC (ci(ci + di − k) − cj (cj + dj − k))(cj (di − k) − ci(dj − k)) 
= � 0 (15)
∂k (ci + cj )2(ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)2 _    
U U ∗ ∗ =x x −xi j i xj 
The marginal impact of cumulative environmental effects on the welfare differential between 
a spatially-differentiated and a uniform regulation depends on how the difference between the 
∗ ∗ U Uterms xi x and xi x is altered. These terms can be interpreted as measures for the spatial j j 
concentration of electricity generation across regions for the respective instrument design. That 
¯is, how the generation of electricity to reach the target X is divided between regions with a 
spatially-differentiated or a uniform instrument. If the difference between xi and xj is high, the 
value xixj is lower than if the difference between xi and xj is low. In other words, a higher 
(lower) spatial concentration of electricity generation is reflected by lower (higher) values of 
the measure xixj . The spatial allocation of electricity generation with a uniform instrument, 
U Uxi , x , is independent of cumulative environmental effects (11). Only the spatial concentration j 
∗ ∗of electricity generation for a spatially-differentiated instrument, xi xj , is affected by cumulative 
environmental effects (5). Therefore, the presence of cumulative environmental effects alters the 
∗ ∗welfare differential ΔSC by determining the spatial concentration of electricity generation xi xj , 
U U ∗ ∗ U Usuch that the term x − x is affected (15). Whenever the difference between x andi xj i xj i xj 
∗ ∗ x is increased (reduced) by the existence of cumulative environmental effects, the welfare i xj 
differential ΔSC is exacerbated (reduced) as well. 
In a next step, we want to know for which levels of cumulative environmental effects the welfare 
differential is minimal. We set the first derivative of the welfare differential with respect to k 
equal to zero and solve for k: 
∂ΔSC cidj − cj di ci(ci + di) − cj (cj + dj )
=0 ⇒ k = = kA or k = = kB
∂k ci − cj ci − cj 
1For a more detailed deduction of ∂Δ
∂k 






The values kA and kB represent two extrema of the social cost function2 . If cumulative environ­
mental effects are equal to either kA or kB , the spatial concentration of electricity generation 
∗ ∗ U Uacross regions is equal for a spatially-differentiated and a uniform instrument, xi x = xi x . To j j 
characterize the type of extremum represented by kA and kB, we insert the two values into the 
second derivative of the welfare differential with respect to k: 
∂2ΔSC (ci + di − cj − dj )2X̄2 
= 
∂k2 (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)3
 
∂2ΔSC ci + di + cj + dj

0 for k  α = (16)
∂k2 2 
∂2ΔSC (ci − cj )3X̄2 |k=kA = > 0 for ci  cj (17)∂k2 (ci + cj )3(ci + di − cj − dj ) 
and ci + di  cj + dj 
∂2ΔSC (ci − cj )3X̄2 |k=kB = − > 0 for ci  cj (18)∂k2 (ci + cj )3(ci + di − cj − dj ) 
and ci + di cj + dj 
Whether kA and kB represent the minimum or the maximum of the welfare differential depends 
on the spatial allocation of generation cost and environmental damage parameters (17, 18). 
In the following, we therefore consider two cases to analyse when kA or kB minimize the welfare 
differential ΔSC. The cases are based on different spatial allocations of generation cost and 
environmental damage parameters. 
Case A: More electricity is produced in the same region for a spatially-differentiated and a 
uniform subsidy 
In case A, we assume that electricity generation is cheaper in region i both regarding generation 
cost parameters ci < cj and social cost parameters ci + di < cj + dj . This applies if generation 
cost and environmental damage parameters are correlated positively across regions (ci < cj and 
di < dj ) or if the difference in generation cost parameters is higher than in environmental dam­
age parameters (| ci − cj |>| di − dj |). Thus, in case A more electricity is generated in the same 
region under both regulatory designs: 
∗ ∗ U U x > x and x > xi j i j 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯X(cj + dj − k) X(ci + di − k) Xcj Xci 
> > 
(ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) (ci + cj ) (ci + cj ) 
cj + dj > ci + di cj > ci 
With (17) we can derive that for this parameter constellation, the minimum of the welfare dif­
= kmin = kmaxferential is represented by kA A . On the contrary, kB B represents a local maximum 
in this case (18). 
To understand how cumulative environmental effects alter the welfare differential ΔSC, we com­
pare k = 0 to the case k = 0. If cumulative environmental effects are not considered, k = 0, the 
2Both values kA and kB may be greater, smaller or equal to zero, depending on the specific realization of 








difference in regional electricity generation for a spatially-differentiated and a uniform instru­
ment depends on the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters and social cost parameters: 
∗ U x xi i 
¯(cj + dj − k)X̄ cj X 
(ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) (ci + cj ) 
with k < α ci(dj − k) cj (di − k) 
ci di ci ci + di
for k = 0 ⇒ 
cj dj cj cj + dj 
We first assume that the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters is higher than in social 
cost parameters. Due to our assumption that ci < cj and ci + di < cj + dj , this is the case if: 
ci di ci ci + di U ∗ U U ∗ ∗ < ⇒ < ⇒ x > x ⇒ x < x (19)i i i xj i xjcj dj cj cj + dj
 
∂ΔSC
 U U ∗ ∗ = xi xj − xi xj < 0 (20)∂k 
Then, more electricity is generated in the region with lower cost parameters with a uniform 
instrument than with a spatially-differentiated instrument. The spatial concentration of elec­
tricity generation is thus higher with a uniform than with a spatially-differentiated instrument 
(19). When cumulative environmental effects are considered, k = 0, their impact on the wel­
fare differential ΔSC depends on their sign and size. If cumulative effects are negative, k < 0, 
they further reduce electricity generation in the region with lower social cost parameters with 
a spatially-differentiated instrument (5). As a result, electricity generation with a spatially­
differentiated instrument is even less concentrated across regions. In other words, the difference 
∗ ∗ U Ubetween x and x increases. Therefore, the welfare differential increases as well for a i xj i xj 
marginal decline in k = 0 (20). If cumulative environmental effects are positive, however, 
k > 0, electricity generation in the region with lower social cost parameters is enhanced with 
a spatially-differentiated instrument. Then, the spatial concentration of electricity generation 
with a spatially-differentiated instrument increases due to the presence of cumulative effects. 
∗ ∗ U UThe difference between x and x is thus reduced, such that the welfare differential is i xj i xj 
reduced as well for marginal increases in k = 0 (20). However, this is only true as long as 
∗ ∗ U ∗ ∗ Uxi xj > x
U
i xj . If k reaches a level such that xi xj < x
U
i xj , the welfare differential increases 
again. For the moment, we focus only on the sign of k. We will analyse the effect of the size of 
k further below (28). 
Next, we assume that the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters is lower than in social 
cost parameters. That is the case if: 
ci di ci ci + di U ∗ U U ∗ ∗ > ⇒ > ⇒ x < x ⇒ xi x > x i x (21)i i j jcj dj cj cj + dj
 
∂ΔSC
 U U ∗ ∗ = xi xj − xi xj > 0 (22)∂k 
In this case, less electricity is generated in the region with lower cost parameters with a uniform 
instrument than with a spatially-differentiated instrument. The spatial concentration of electric­
ity generation is then lower with a uniform than with a spatially-differentiated instrument (21). 
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Again, positive cumulative effects, k > 0, enhance electricity generation in the region with lower 
social cost parameters with a spatially-differentiated instrument (5). The spatial concentration 
of electricity generation with a spatially-differentiated instrument is increased. However, now 
this results in an increase in the difference in the spatial concentration of electricity generation 
with a uniform and a spatially-differentiated instrument. Thus, contrary to the former exam­
ple, k > 0 increases the welfare differential ΔSC (22). When cumulative effects are negative, 
k < 0, they decrease electricity generation in the region with lower social cost parameters with 
a spatially-differentiated instrument. Then, the spatial concentration of electricity generation 
with a spatially-differentiated instrument is reduced due to the existence of cumulative effects. 
∗ ∗ U UAs a result, the difference between x j and x is reduced and ΔSC is diminished. i x i xj 
When cumulative environmental effects equal kmin, regional electricity generation is identical A 
U ∗ U ∗for the two regulatory designs, x = xi , x = x (14), such that the welfare differential is i j j 
equal to zero. The sign of kmin depends on the heterogeneity in generation cost and social cost A 
parameters as well. If the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters is higher than in social 
cost parameters, kmin > 0. On the contrary, if the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters A 
is lower than in social cost parameters, kmin < 0.A 
To sum up, in case A, the impact of cumulative environmental effects on the welfare differen­
tial between the two regulatory designs depends both on the heterogeneity in generation cost 
and social cost parameters and on the sign and size of k. If the heterogeneity in generation 
cost parameters is higher (lower) than in social cost parameters, negative (positive) cumulative 
environmental effects always increase the welfare differential. However, positive (negative) cu­
mulative effects may decrease it. Evidently, the sign of kmin is then also positive (negative). If A 
cumulative effects equal kmin, the welfare differential is zero. A 
Case B: More electricity is produced in different regions for a spatially-differentiated and a 
uniform subsidy 
In case B, we change our assumption to ci < cj and ci + di > cj + dj . This is true if generation 
cost and environmental damage parameters are negatively correlated across regions (ci < cj and 
di > dj ) and if the difference in environmental damage parameters is higher than in generation 
cost parameters (| ci − cj |<| di − dj |). Thus, in case B more electricity is generated in different 
regions for a spatially-differentiated and a uniform instrument: 
∗ ∗ U U x < x and x > xi j i j 
cj + dj < ci + di cj > ci 
From (18) we know that now the welfare differential ΔSC is minimal if cumulative environmen­
= kmin = kmaxtal effects are equal to kB B . The value kA A represents a local maximum (17). 
Again, if cumulative environmental effects are neglected, k = 0, the difference in regional electric­
ity generation for the two regulatory designs depends on the spatial heterogeneity in generation 
cost parameters and social cost parameters. However, because in case B more electricity is gen­







generations for opposite regions are compared:
 
∗ U xj xi 
(ci + di − k)X̄ cj X̄
(ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) (ci + cj ) 
with k < α ci(ci + di − k) cj (cj + dj − k) 
ci (cj + dj)
for k = 0 
cj (ci + di) 
Like in case A, we first assume that the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters is higher 
than in social cost parameters. Because of the assumption that ci < cj and ci + di > cj + dj , 
this is the case if: 
ci (cj + dj ) U ∗ U U ∗ ∗ < ⇒ x > x ⇒ x < x (23)i j i xj i xjcj (ci + di)
 
∂ΔSC
 U U ∗ ∗ = xi xj − xi xj < 0 (24)∂k 
Then, more electricity is generated in the region with lower generation cost parameters under 
a uniform instrument than in the region with lower social cost parameters under a spatially­
differentiated instrument. The spatial concentration of electricity generation is thus higher with 
a uniform than with a spatially-differentiated regulation (23). 
Again, we are interested in how cumulative environmental effects alter the welfare differential. 
If cumulative effects are negative, k < 0, electricity generation in the region with lower social 
cost parameters decreases under a spatially-differentiated instrument (5). Thus, the spatial con­
centration of electricity generation with a spatially-differentiated instrument is reduced. The 
∗ ∗ U Udifference between xi xj and xi x amplifies and the welfare differential increases (24). If cumu­j 
lative environmental effects are positive, k > 0, electricity generation in the region with lower 
social cost parameters rises. Then, the spatial concentration of electricity generation with a 
∗ ∗ U Uspatially-differentiated instrument increases and the difference between xi x and xi x is re­j j 
duced. The welfare differential decreases as well (24).
 




ci (cj + dj ) U ∗ U U ∗ ∗ > ⇒ x < x ⇒ xi x > x i x (25)i j j jcj (ci + di)
 
∂ΔSC
 U U ∗ ∗ = xi xj − xi xj > 0 (26)∂k 
The spatial concentration of electricity generation is thus lower with a uniform than with a 
spatially-differentiated instrument (25). Positive cumulative environmental effects, k > 0, 
further enhance electricity generation in the region with lower social cost parameters with a 
spatially-differentiated regulation. The spatial concentration of electricity generation for this 
U U ∗ ∗instrument design is then increased. The difference between x and x j thus rises and the i xj i x 
welfare differential increases as well for k > 0 (26). Thus, as in case A, the impact of cumulative 
effects on the welfare differential is now reversed. If cumulative environmental effects are nega­




a spatially-differentiated instrument. The spatial concentration of electricity generation under 
the two regulatory designs then becomes more similar, i.e. the difference between xU U andi xj 
∗ ∗ x is reduced. As a result, the welfare differential decreases (26). i xj 
In case B, the welfare differential is minimized if k = kB . Then, regional electricity generation 
is perfectly opposed for a spatially-differentiated and a uniform instrument, i.e. xU = x ∗ andi j 
xU = x ∗ The spatial concentration of electricity generation is hence equal for the two regula­j i .
 
U U ∗ ∗
tory designs x = x However, the welfare differential is still greater than zero, because i xj i xj . 
regional electricity generation diverges for the two instrument designs: 
−(ci − cj )(ci + di − cj − dj )X̄2 
ΔSC|k=kmin = (27)B 2(ci + cj ) 
ΔSC|k=kmin > 0 for ci cj and ci + di cj + djB 
As in case A, the sign of kmin relies on the spatial heterogeneity of generation cost and social cost B 
parameters. If generation cost parameters vary more than social cost parameters at a spatial 
scale, kmin > 0. Otherwise, kmin < 0.B B 
Overall, in case B, we can identify the same rule for the impact of cumulative environmental 
effects on the welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated and a spatially-uniform in­
strument. If the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters is higher (lower) than in social cost 
parameters, negative (positive) cumulative effects always increase the welfare differential. Yet, 
positive (negative) cumulative effects may decrease or even minimize the welfare differential. 
Accordingly, kmin is positive (negative). B 
The marginal impact of the cumulative effect k on ΔSC in cases A and B is summarized in 




Assumption: Based on dif­
ferent spatial distributions of 
generation cost parameters 
and social cost parameters, 
more electricity is generated 
in the same or in different re­
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j − x ∗ i x ∗ j 
Case A: Same region 
kmin A = 
cidj −cj di 
ci−cj 
ci < cj 
ci + di < cj + dj 
ci > cj 
ci + di > cj + dj 










∂k = 0, ΔSC = 0 
ci 
cj 
< ci+di cj +dj |k| < |k
min 
A | xU i xU j < x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k < 0 
|k| > |kmin A | xU i xU j > x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k > 0 
ci 
cj 
> ci+di cj +dj |k| < |k
min 
A | xU i xU j > x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k > 0 
|k| > |kmin A | xU i xU j < x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k < 0 
ci 
cj 
< ci+di cj +dj |k| < |k
min 
A | xU i xU j > x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k > 0 
|k| > |kmin A | xU i xU j < x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k < 0 
ci 
cj 
> ci+di cj +dj |k| < |k
min 
A | xU i xU j < x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k < 0 
|k| > |kmin A | xU i xU j > x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k > 0 
Case B: Different regions 
kmin B = 
ci(ci+di)−cj (cj +dj ) 
ci−cj 
ci < cj 
ci + di > cj + dj 
ci > cj 
ci + di < cj + dj 










∂k = 0, ΔSC > 0 
ci 
cj 
< cj +dj ci+di |k| < |k
min 
B | xU i xU j < x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k < 0 
|k| > |kmin B | xU i xU j > x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k > 0 
ci 
cj 
> cj +dj ci+di |k| < |k
min 
B | xU i xU j > x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k > 0 
|k| > |kmin B | xU i xU j < x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k < 0 
ci 
cj 
< cj +dj ci+di |k| < |k
min 
B | xU i xU j > x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k > 0 
|k| > |kmin B | xU i xU j < x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k < 0 
ci 
cj 
> cj +dj ci+di |k| < |k
min 
B | xU i xU j < x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k < 0 
|k| > |kmin B | xU i xU j > x ∗ i x ∗ j ∂ΔSC ∂k > 0 
Table 1: Impact of an increase in cumulative environmental effects k on the welfare differential between a 
spatially-differentiated and a uniform regulation ΔSC for different spatial correlations and levels of spatial 
heterogeneity in generation cost parameters ci, cj and social cost parameters ci + di, cj + dj . 
In both cases A and B, the impact of cumulative environmental effects on the welfare dif­
ferential between a spatially-differentiated and a uniform instrument depends on the sign of the 
cumulative effect k. If k and kmin display different signs, the existence of cumulative effects 
increases the welfare differential as compared to the case k = 0. However, if k and kmin display 
the same sign, cumulative effects may decrease the welfare differential ΔSC as compared to the 
case k = 0. Whether this is the case additionally depends on the size of cumulative environ­
mental effects. Therefore, we calculate the welfare differential for k = 0 and derive the size of 
the cumulative environmental effect k0 for which the welfare differential is identical: 
(cidj − cj di)2X̄2 
ΔSC|k=0 = 
2(ci + cj )2(ci + di + cj + dj ) 
2(cj di − cidj )(cj (cj + dj ) − ci(ci + di))
ΔSC = ΔSC|k=0 ⇒ k = = k0 (28)
(ci − cj )2(ci + di + cj + dj ) 
The welfare differential is equal for the two values k = 0 and k = k0 . Thus, the welfare 
differential between a spatially-differentiated and a uniform instrument is decreased by the 
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existence of cumulative environmental effects if 0 < k < k0 or k0 < k < 0. If |k| > |k0|, the 
welfare differential is increased instead. 
Our results show that the existence of cumulative environmental effects may either enhance 
or reduce the welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated and a uniform instrument. 
Which of the options applies depends on the sign and size of cumulative environmental effects 
as well as on the spatial heterogeneity of generation cost and social cost parameters. If the 
heterogeneity in generation cost parameters is higher (lower) than in social cost parameters and 
cumulative environmental effects are negative (positive), cumulative environmental effects always 
increase the welfare differential. However, if the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters is 
higher (lower) than in social cost parameters, positive (negative) cumulative environmental 
effects may decrease the welfare differential as opposed to the case k = 0. This is true as long 
as the absolute value of cumulative effects does not exceed the absolute value of k0 . Whenever 
cumulative effects are equal to the value kmin, the welfare differential is minimal. 
5 Numerical Calibration 
In the theoretical model, we demonstrate that cumulative environmental effects, in addition to 
spatially-varying environmental damages, matter for the efficient regulation of RES deployment. 
Next, we want to generate insights on the empirical relevance of cumulative environmental 
effects and spatially heterogeneous environmental damages for optimal RES deployment. We 
therefore calibrate our model for the example of electricity generation from onshore wind power 
in Germany. 
5.1 Set up 
For the calibration, the regions from the theoretical model are represented by the German 
federal states. We focus on neighbouring federal states because, with the present knowledge on 
cumulative environmental effects, we assume it most realistic that these effects occur between 
spatially connected regions. Furthermore, we exclude the German city states as well as the 
state Saarland from our calibration. Thus, we only consider the territorial federal states. The 
reason for this is that onshore wind power plants can only be deployed at a significant level in 
federal states that command a sufficient amount of space for the deployment3 . Consequently, 
we calibrate our model for the twelve remaining territorial federal states4, which results in the 
analysis of 24 pairs of neighbouring states. 
For each state, we use the quadratic generation cost function: 
c2i
Ci(xi) = c1ixi + x 
2 i = 1, ..., 12 (29)i2 
3This is also reflected by the current deployment status of onshore wind power in the German federal states. 
The city states Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen as well as the state Saarland display the lowest numbers in both wind 
turbines installend and installed capacities, as compared to the remaining federal states (Deutsche WindGuard 
GmbH, 2020). 
4We consider the twelve territorial German federal states Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW), Bavaria (BY), Bran­
denburg (BB), Hessia (HE), Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (MV), Lower Saxony (NI), North Rhine-Westphalia 




The two coefficients c1i and 
c2i are estimated for each state in a linear regression model by Meier 2 
and Lehmann (2020) based on site-specific levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) from Tafarte 
and Lehmann (2019). For each federal state, aggregate wind power generation costs are thus 
approximated by the quadratic function (29). Respective state-specific coefficients are specified 
in Appendix D. 
Equivalently, environmental damage coefficients for each state are estimated with a regression 
model by Meier and Lehmann (2020) based on site-specific data for environmental damages 
from Tafarte and Lehmann (2019). Based on the regression results, state-specific environmental 
damages can be approximated by a quadratic function: 
di 2Di(xi) = x i = 1, ..., 12 (30)i2 
The state-specific coefficients di for region-specific environmental damages may also be found in 
Appendix D. In our calibration example, we focus on damages caused by onshore wind power 
turbines for residents. Tafarte and Lehmann (2019) compute site-specific environmental damages 
as a function of the distance of a household to the wind turbine and aggregate over all households 
living in a 4km radius of a site. Environmental damage levels for different turbine-settlement 
distances are based on people’s willingness to pay (WTP) for different buffer zones between 
turbines and their residence. Environmental damages rise as the distance of turbine-sites to 
settlements decreases. In this setup, heterogeneity of environmental damages at the federal 
state level stems from different levels of proximity between turbine sites and households and 
different population sizes in each state. 
As in the theoretical model, aggregate environmental damages amount to: 
di dj2 2D(xi, xj ) = xi + xj + kxixj i = j (31)2 2 
In our calibration example, cumulative environmental effects can arise due to distributive justice 
preferences at a spatial scale. If these preferences call for a spatially more even allocation of 
wind turbines across regions, this implies that residents perceive wind turbines as less disturbing 
if they are sited in both regions. The corresponding cumulative impact parameter is then nega­
tive, k < 0. However, we refrain from assumptions regarding the sign and size of the cumulative 
environmental effect parameter k. The main reason for this is that the model calibration aims 
at understanding the sensitivity of the welfare differential between a spatially-uniform and a 
spatially-differentiated regulation regarding cumulative environmental effects. In addition, to 
our knowledge no valid empirical estimations for k exist to date. 
Due to the assumption of quadratic generation costs (1) and quadratic environmental damages 
¯(2) in the theoretical model, the generation target X disproportionately increases the welfare dif­
ferential between a spatially-differentiated and a uniform regulation (13). Therefore, to support 
the comparability of the calibrated results across the 24 pairs of neighbouring federal states, we 
use the same aggregate electricity production target for onshore wind power for each state pair. 
The target is derived by first setting the national electricity generation objective for onshore 
wind power at 250 TWh. This level corresponds to the amount of onshore wind power that is 
approximately needed to fulfil the German renewable energy generation targets for 2033 (Agora 
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Energiewende, 2013). Second, we simplify by assuming that each federal state can theoretically 
contribute the same amount of electricity generation from onshore wind power to achieve the na­
tional target5 . Therefore, the generation target at the federal state level is set to 250TWh = 20.8312 
¯TWh. Finally, to achieve the electricity generation target for two states, X, the federal target 
¯is doubled. Thus, we assume X = 250 = 41.67 TWh. 6 
5.2 Results 
The calibration results for the 24 pairs of neighbouring federal states are displayed in table 2. 
The first column of table 2 shows the pairs of neighbouring federal states, while the second 
column characterizes whether the state pair represents case A or case B from the theoretical 
model. In 20 pairs of neighbouring states, the majority of electricity from onshore wind power 
¯to reach the target X is generated in the same state under both a spatially-differentiated and 
a spatially-uniform regulation (case A). This can be derived from the third and fourth column 
of table 2, which display the ratio of regional electricity generation levels for the two regulatory 
¯designs. In the remaining four state pairs, the majority of X is generated in different states for 
a spatially-differentiated and a spatially-uniform instrument (case B). 
The calibration results confirm that both heterogeneity in generation costs and region-specific 
environmental damage parameters as well as cumulative environmental effects impact the welfare 
differential between a spatially-differentiated and uniform instrument design. 
5.2.1 Heterogeneity in generation cost and environmental damage parameters 
First, the effect of spatial heterogeneity in generation cost parameters and environmental dam­
age parameters on the welfare differential between the two regulatory designs is assessed if 
cumulative environmental effects are neglected, i.e. assuming k = 0. The coefficients c1i, c2i 
and di, dj suggest that both generation cost and environmental damage parameters vary con­
siderably across the German federal states (see Appendix D). While linear coefficients c1i of 
generation costs range from 0.040 in Lower Saxony to 0.062 in Baden-Wuerttemberg, quadratic 
coefficients c2i display higher levels of variation, ranging from 1.42 · 10−13 in Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania to 2.52 · 10−12 in Rhineland-Palatinate. Environmental damage coefficients 
di vary even more, ranging from 4.29 · 10−13 in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania to 2.11 · 10−11 
in Rhineland-Palatinate. In the absence of cumulative environmental effects, this heterogeneity 
translates into considerable welfare losses associated with a spatially-uniform as opposed to a 
spatially-differentiated regulation of electricity generation. As demonstrated in column eight of 
table 2, the respective welfare differential ΔSC|k=0 may become as high as 2.22 · 109e for the 
state pair North Rhine-Westphalia (NW) and Rhineland-Palatinate (RP). 
Furthermore, the calibration indicates that similar regional allocations of electricity generation, 
xi, xj , for the two regulatory designs need not coincide with lower levels of the corresponding 
welfare differential. This insight is visualised in figure 1 below. Neighbouring states with smaller 
5Of course, in reality, the number of potential sites for onshore wind turbines and therefore the possible 
contribution to a national electricity generation target differs across the German federal states (Masurowski 




differences between state-specific electricity generation, i.e. with lower differences i − i , can ∗ Uxj xj 
display both lower and higher levels of the respective welfare differential (dots close to the y­
axis). The same is true for state pairs with higher differences between state-specific electricity 
generation ratios (dots further away from the y-axis). This result is based on the heterogene­
ity of generation cost and environmental damage parameters. Even small deviations from the 
socially optimal spatial allocation of electricity generation across regions may eventuate in high 
welfare losses if the disparity of generation cost and environmental damage parameters across 
regions is pronounced. 
Figure 1: Correlation between the difference in state electricity generation ratios for a spatially-differentiated 
∗ U
i 
represented by dark blue dots, case B state pairs are represented by light blue dots. Results for neighbouring 
states NW and HE, NW and RP as well as NI and NW are not depicted in the figure. Because these cases display 
x x 
x










is relatively high (NINW), xirelatively high levels for ΔSC (NWHE, NWRP) or because the difference ∗ xj 
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5.2.2 Cumulative environmental effects 
In addition to the heterogeneity of generation cost parameters and environmental damage pa­
rameters, the presence of cumulative environmental effects, k = 0, considerably influences the 
welfare gains of a spatially-differentiated instrument design. For neighbouring states represent­
ing both case A or B, these gains may be reduced or increased by cumulative environmental 
effects. The possible decrease of the welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated and 
kminuniform instrument due to the existence of cumulative effects is maximal if k = (column 
five in table 2). The level of this reduction, captured in the last column of table 2, is mostly 
higher in cases A than in cases B, because in cases A, cumulative effects might result in iden­
tical state-specific electricity generation for the two instrument designs. For example, consider 
the case B neighbouring states Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (MV) and Lower Saxony (NI). 
The existence of cumulative environmental effects may reduce the welfare differential between a 
spatially-differentiated and a spatially-uniform regulation of wind power development in these 
states by up to 28% or 9.57 million Euro. In North Rhine-Westphalia (NW) and Rhineland-
Palatinate (RP), similarly case B, the welfare differential may be reduced by up to 2% or 48.1 
million Euro. In neighbouring states representing case A, cumulative effects could potentially 
reduce the welfare differential to zero, resulting in a maximal relative reduction of 100%. Also in 
absolute terms, possible changes in the welfare differential in case A mostly exceed the changes 
in case B. For example, the welfare differential in North Rhine-Westphalia (NW) and Hessia 
(HE), case A, may be diminished by 682 million Euro due to cumulative environmental effects, 
which is the highest possible absolute amount for all state combinations. 
Recall from the theoretical model that whether cumulative environmental effects actually re­
duce the welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated and uniform instrument design is 
contingent on two factors: the sign and the size of k. First, cumulative environmental effects 
only reduce the welfare differential if they display the same sign as the value kmin . Otherwise, 
the welfare differential is accentuated rather than diminished by the existence of cumulative 
environmental effects. Second, if kmin and k display the same sign, only cumulative environ­
mental effects |k| < |k0| reduce the welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated and 
uniform regulation. If cumulative environmental effects exceed this level, the welfare differential 
is enhanced as compared to k = 0. These findings are illustrated by two case A examples. 
For the state pair North Rhine-Westphalia (NW) and Hessia (HE), the ratios of regional elec­
tricity generation show that more electricity is produced in Hessia for both instrument designs, 
∗ Ux xNW NW 
∗ , U < 1 (case A). However, the concentration of electricity generation in Hessia is higher x xHE HE 
∗ Ux xNW NW for the spatially-differentiated than for the uniform regulation, ∗ < U . Negative cu­x xHE HE 
mulative environmental effects favour a lower concentration of electricity generation in Hessia 
with a spatially-differentiated instrument, therefore kmin < 0. Consequently, merely negative A 
cumulative environmental effects potentially reduce the welfare differential between the two in­
strument designs, i.e. k < 0, while positive cumulative environmental effects exacerbate the 
welfare differential – independent of their level. This is graphically depicted in figure 2. The 
blue graph represents the welfare differential ΔSCNW,HE depending on the level of cumulative 
environmental effects, k. It is increasing in k > 0 and decreasing in k < 0 as long as k0 < k < 0. 
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That is, whenever cumulative environmental effects exceed the level k0, the welfare differential 
is higher than in the absence of cumulative environmental effects. The orange line represents 
this by capturing the level of the welfare differential for cumulative environmental effects of the 
size k = k0 and k = 0. 
k = kmink = k0 A k = 0 
Levels of k reducing ΔSC as 
compared to k = 0 
Figure 2: Level of the welfare differential ΔSC between a spatially-uniform and a spatially-differentiated regu­
lation based on the level of cumulative environmental effects k for the neighbouring states Northrhine Westfalia 
(NW) and Hessia (HE), kmin = −1.51 · 10−11 , k0 = −4.69 · 10−11, ΔSC|k=k0 = 6, 82 · 108 .A 
The opposite is true for states Thuringia (TH) and Bavaria (BY), depicted in figure 3. As 
the previous state combination, this state pair represents case A: For both instrument design 
U ∗ x xTH TH types, more electricity is produced in Thuringia, , > 1. Yet, the concentration of elec-U ∗ xx BY BY 
tricity generation in Thuringia is more pronounced for a spatially-uniform than for a spatially­
∗ Ux xTH NW differentiated instrument, ∗ < U . Positive cumulative environmental effects reinforce the x xBY HE 
concentration of electricity generation in Thuringia under a spatially-differentiated instrument, 
such that kmin > 0. Thus, only k > 0 may decrease the welfare differential between the two reg-A 
ulatory designs. However, when positive cumulative environmental effects exceed k0, the welfare 
differential increases again. Therefore, cumulative environmental effects 0 < k < k0 reduce the 
welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated and uniform regulation, while k < 0 and 
k > k0 result in an increase of the welfare differential. 
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k = kmink = 0 A k = k0
 
Levels of k reducing ΔSC as
 
compared to k = 0
 
Figure 3: Level of the welfare differential ΔSC between a spatially-uniform and a spatially-differentiated regu­
lation based on the level of cumulative environmental effects k for the neighbouring states Thuringia (TH) and 
Bavaria (BY), kmin = 2.09 · 10−12 , k0 = 3.29 · 10−12, ΔSC|k=k0,k=0 = 5, 95 · 107 .A 
To gain insights into the relative level of the parameters kmin and k0 as compared to region­




, are calculated for each pair of di dj di dj 
neighbouring states considered (see columns six and seven of table 2). The results are displayed 
graphically in figure 4. Black and blue lines correspond to black and blue states of the respective 
k0 k0 state pair. The background of case B state pairs is tinted in grey. Ratios and aredi dj 
represented by dots. Each line in table 4 represents the range of cumulative environmental 
effects k that reduce the welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated and a uniform 































Figure 4: Ratio of different levels of cumulative environmental effects and state-specific environmental damages 
k0 kmin for neighbouring federal states in Germany. Dots mark k
0 
, while dashes represent k
min 
, . Lines represent 
di dj di dj 
the level of cumulative environmental effects relative to region-specific environmental damagas that results in a 
welfare differential that is as high as or lower than in the absence of cumulative environmental effects, k = 0. 
Background tinted white for case A state pairs and grey for case B state pairs. Ratios not represented in the figure 
k0 k0 k0 k0 due to scaling reasons: MV–NI = −18, 40, BB–ST = −19, 38, ST – TH = −79, 36 = −99, 34.
dM V dB B dS T dT H 
As the length of the lines indicate, this range varies significantly between the state pairs. The 




, i.e. the level of relative cumulative environmental effects di dj 
that minimizes the welfare differential between the two regulatory designs. Overall, small ranges 
of cumulative environmental effects that reduce the welfare differential are characterized by rela­




and vice versa. Therefore, in some cases cumulative environmental di dj 
effects that are weak in comparison to environmental damages from regional electricity gener­
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ation fully offset the welfare gains from spatially differentiating regulation. However, in these 
cases the range of cumulative environmental effects that actually reduce the welfare differential is 
small as well. This is for example the case in states Hessia (HE) and Rhineland Palatinite (RP). 
Cumulative environmental effects that amount to only 0.3 times the environmental damage pa­
rameter in Hessia or 0.1 times the environmental damage parameter in Rhineland Palatinite 
suffice to offset the welfare gains from a spatially-differentiated instrument. However, if cumu­
lative environmental effects are larger than 0.6 times the environmental damage parameter in 
Hessia or than 0.25 times the environmental damage parameter in Rhineland Palatinite, they 
cause an increase in the welfare differential as compared to k = 0. 
In contrast, for some state pairs relatively large cumulative environmental effects are needed 
to minimize the welfare gains from a spatially-differentiated as compared to a uniform instru­
ment. This is the case in Brandenburg (BB) and Saxony (SN), where cumulative environmental 
effects equal to 2.7 times the environmental damage parameter in Brandenburg or 1.5 times 
the damage parameter in Saxony are needed to minimize the welfare gains from a spatially­
differentiated regulation. On the other hand, the range of cumulative environmental effects that 
result in a decrease of the welfare differential is relatively high for these states. In Branden­
burg and Saxony, cumulative environmental effects of up to 9.3 times the damage parameter in 
Brandenburg or 5.2 times the environmental damage parameter in Saxony reduce the welfare 
gains from a spatially-differentiated regulation. In general, figure 4 illustrates that the range 
of cumulative environmental effects that reduces or even minimizes the welfare gains from a 
spatially-differentiated as compared to a spatially-uniform instrument differs considerably be­
tween the state pairs and therefore highly depends on the state pair of interest. 
Overall, the calibration confirmes the results from the theoretical model for the example of 
onshore wind power deployment across the German federal states. Cumulative environmental 
effects impact the welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated and a uniform regula­
tion. Thus, the welfare differential may be reduced or even offset due to presence of cumulative 
effects. However, in order to assess whether this is actually the case, knowledge about the sign 
and size of cumulative environmental effects as well as about the values kmin and k0 is essential. 
The state pairs displayed considerable differences regarding these values. For some state pairs, 
rather large cumulative environmental effects are required to minimize the welfare differential 
between a spatially-differentiated and uniform regulation. In these cases, the range of cumu­
lative environmental effects that reduce the welfare differential is quite large as well. On the 
contrary, for other state pairs rather weak cumulative effects suffice to minimize the welfare 
gains from spatially differentiating regulation. The range of cumulative environmental effects 
that decrease the welfare differential between the two regulatory designs is then equally small. 
Clearly, if the above mentioned conditions for cumulative environmental effects are not met, 




The findings from the theoretical model show that efficient regulation for RES deployment is 
spatially-differentiated in the presence of both spatially-heterogeneous and cumulative environ­
mental effects from RES electricity generation. Thus, we confirm the results regarding the 
optimal regulation of spatially heterogeneous environmental externalities found by the previ­
ous literature (Tietenberg, 1995; Kolstad, 1987; Waetzold and Drechsler, 2005). We further 
expand the framework to the additional presence of cumulative environmental effects. If ex 
ante the regulator is incompletely informed about generation costs, environmental damages or 
cumulative effects, a spatially-uniform instrument may turn out to be more efficient than a 
spatially-differentiated regulation ex post (Fowlie and Muller, 2019). However, this possibility 
does not alter the ex-ante policy decision. 
Our findings extend the existing literature by indicating that understanding the characteristics 
of cumulative environmental effects is essential for the efficient design of a spatially-differentiated 
instrument. The welfare gains from spatially-differentiating instrument design may be altered 
substantially by the existence of cumulative effects on the environment. This is confirmed by the 
results from the numerical calibration. If cumulative effects on the environment are neglected, 
the welfare gains from spatially-differentiating instrument design already fluctuate considerably, 
depending on the state pair of interest. This fluctuation is based on the spatial heterogeneity of 
generation cost and environmental damage parameters. Taking cumulative effects on the envi­
ronment into account can further reduce or increase the welfare differential, depending on the 
sign and size of cumulative environmental effects. For example, for the state pair Hessia (HE) 
and North Rhine-Westphalia (NW) the welfare differential between a spatially-differentiated 
kminand a uniform instrument may be offset completely (for k = = −1.5 · 10−11) or doubled A 
(for k = 3.6 · 10−12) by the presence of cumulative environmental effects. Thus, understanding 
cumulative effects on the environment that arise in the course of RES electricity generation 
matters for optimal spatially-differentiated instrument design. 
Our analysis reveals that to determine how cumulative environmental effects impact the welfare 
differential between a spatially-differentiated and a uniform instrument design, three types of in­
formation are relevant. First, the regulator needs to be informed about the spatial heterogeneity 
of generation cost and environmental damage parameters. Only based on this knowledge, it is 
possible to derive the regional concentration of electricity generation for a spatially-differentiated 
and spatially-uniform instrument in the absence of cumulative environmental effects, and thus 
the sign and size of the value of cumulative effects for which the welfare differential is minimal 
kmin . Regarding generation costs of RES electricity, the regulator’s information status can be 
assumed to be rather high, since these costs predominantly arise from site-specific natural con­
ditions for which data is mostly available and accessible (e.g. wind yield or solar radiation). 
However, region-specific environmental damage parameters are contingent on local or regional 
characteristics for which data is less complete or available, depending on the environmental effect 
of interest. Nevertheless, the regulator may be able to observe if environmental damages from 
RES electricity generation in one region are higher or lower than in another region. For example, 
if a wind turbine is sited in a high-quality habitat for a wind power sensitive bird species, it 
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most likely causes higher damages to the regional bird population than if sited in a low-quality 
habitat. With this information, the regulator can deduce the sign of kmin . Yet, to also draw 
conclusions on the size of kmin, information about the difference between region-specific damage 
parameters is needed. If available at all, this information is more complex to collect. 
Second, the regulator must be able to observe the sign of actual cumulative environmental effects 
k. This knowledge is needed to determine whether cumulative effects pronounce (if k and kmin 
display different signs) or potentially reduce (if the signs are identical) the welfare differential 
between a spatially-differentiated and uniform instrument. Since cumulative environmental ef­
fects from interregional RES deployment are only recently gaining in importance, information 
on these effects is scarce. However, depending on the environmental impact of interest, first ob­
servations reveal some insight on the direction of cumulative environmental effects. For example, 
regarding the impact of onshore wind turbines on wind power sensitive bird species, cumulative 
environmental effects reflect the impact of deploying wind power in several regions that occurs 
in addition to region-specific impacts (Schaub, 2012; Drewitt and Langston, 2006; Gill et al., 
2001). In this case, cumulative effects would have a positive sign k > 0 since interregional wind 
power deployment negatively affects aggregate damages from wind power generation to wind 
power sensitive bird populations. 
Third, to determine the impact of cumulative environmental effects on the welfare deficit of a 
spatially-uniform instrument, information on both, the level of cumulative environmental effects 
and the value of k0 is essential. This knowledge is needed to specify if cumulative environmental 
effects increase (if |k| > |k0|) or reduce (if |k| < |k0|) the welfare deficit of a spatially-uniform 
instrument design. It can be assumed that these are the most challenging informational require­
ments. Measuring cumulative environmental effects implies collecting data at an interregional 
scale. This is a challenging task, since both the complexity of collecting the data and the number 
and type of stakeholders involved in the data collection process are likely to increase with scale 
(Masden et al., 2010; Dahl et al., 2012; Schaub, 2012; May et al., 2019). To determine the value 
of k0, the regulator needs to be perfectly informed about generation cost and environmental 
damage parameters. As argued above, this might be reasonable to assume for generation costs. 
However, information or uncertainty regarding environmental damage parameters is most likely 
incomplete. 
Overall, informational requirements to design a spatially-differentiated instrument and to assess 
the impact of cumulative environmental effects on the welfare differential between a spatially­
differentiated and a uniform regulation are high. Thus, while a spatially-differentiated instru­
ment reaches the socially optimal allocation of electricity generation across regions in theory, 
the welfare gains associated with the spatial differentiation of instrument design may be re­
duced or offset by corresponding higher transaction costs in practice (Lehmann, 2012; Coggan 
et al., 2010). These include costs of collecting information on regional environmental damage 
parameters and cumulative effects as well as costs of administration and implementation of a 
spatially-differentiated instrument. The level of these transaction costs will depend on the spa­
tial detail of the regulation and on the number of governmental levels included in the policy 
process (Coggan et al., 2010). If the welfare gains of a spatially-differentiated instrument do 
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not outweigh the transaction costs associated with this type of regulation, a spatially-uniform 
instrument may be the rational policy choice. 
Finally, calibration results indicate that the potential welfare gains from a spatially-differentiated 
instrument highly depend on the regions regulated. This is based on the fact that the level of 
and the heterogeneity in generation costs and environmental damages are rather context spe­
cific. Combined with the informational requirements for the decision on a spatially-uniform 
or differentiated instrument, this supports the inclusion of regional government levels into the 
regulatory decision-making process. Thereby, regional knowledge on heterogeneous generation 
cost and environmental damage parameters can be exploited. 
The above described results rest upon several assumptions that are worth discussing. We use the 
∂2Ci(xi)standard assumption of increasing marginal generation costs > 0 to reflect the spatial 
∂x2 i 
heterogeneity of relevant natural conditions for RES electricity generation (e.g. wind speed or 
solar radiation) within regions. Because a profit maximizing electricity producer will draw on 
sites with lowest marginal generation costs (and thus with most favourable natural conditions) 
first, marginal generation costs increase with electricity generation. It is arguable that if regions 
are small enough, natural conditions for RES electricity generation might not differ significantly 
∂2Ci(xi)between sites, such that marginal generation costs within regions are constant = 0. In 
∂x2 i 
this case, the presence of cumulative environmental effects may be irrelevant for the welfare 
outcome of a spatially-uniform or spatially-differentiated instrument. This case applies if en­
∂2D(xi)vironmental damages caused by regional electricity generation are linear as well = 0
∂x2 i 
and if, in addition, cumulative environmental effects are positive k > 0. If both generation costs 
and regional environmental damages are linear, a spatially-uniform and a spatially-differentiated 
instrument result in the concentration of electricity generation in one region only (though not 
necessarily in the same region, depending on the spatial distribution of generation costs and 
environmental damage parameters). Positive cumulative environmental effects k > 0 merely 
increase environmental damages if generation takes place in more than one region. Therefore, 
regional electricity generation is unaltered by the presence of cumulative environmental effects 
for both a spatially-differentiated and a uniform instrument. If cumulative environmental effects 
are negative k < 0 instead, electricity generation in both regions may reduce the social costs 
of electricity generation. Therefore, they can affect the welfare differential between a spatially­
uniform and spatially-differentiated instrument. 
Regarding environmental damages, we assume increasing marginal damages per kWh of regional 
∂2D(xi)RES electricity generation > 0. As argued in section 2, similar to the case of generation 
∂x2 i 
costs, the level of environmental damages of RES electricity generation is not equal for each 
production site. Instead, it varies with site-specific characteristics, e.g. for wind power plants 
onshore this might refer to their proximity to residential areas or to the type of bird or bat 
habitat they are located in. From an environmental damages perspective it is rational to use 
sites with lower environmental damages first and expand to sites with higher environmental 
damages in the course of expanding regional RES electricity generation. Therefore, marginal 
environmental damages from regional electricity generation are assumed to be increasing. If 




they favour electricity generation in the region with lower environmental damage parameters 
only. If generation costs are increasing they call for electricity generation in both regions in­
stead. The impact of cumulative environmental effects in this setup depends on various model 
parameters, including the spatial distribution of generation cost and environmental damage pa­
¯rameters as well as the generation target X. 
The existence of cumulative environmental effects suggests that aggregate environmental dam­
ages caused by interregional RES development are higher or lower than the sum of environmental 
damages from region-specific electricity generation. We chose the most basic way to model this 
property of aggregate environmental damages by adding the product of regional electricity gen­
eration levels weighted by a cumulative environmental impact factor k to the sum of regional 
djenvironmental damages D(xi, xj ) = 
di 
j + kxixj . 
that aggregate environmental damages are increased (reduced) by electricity generation in both 
regions. Waetzold and Drechsler (2005) model cumulative benefits from biodiversity-enhancing 
land-use measures by multiplying regional benefits Btot = B1B2. However, this suggests that 
2 
aggregate benefits are only positive if biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures are implemented 
in both regions. If they take place in one region only, then aggregate benefits are zero. If ag­
2
gregate environmental damages in our model would be represented by the product of regional 
environmental damages, then damages would be minimized (equal to zero) if generation was 
concentrated in one region only, independently of the level of environmental damages in this re­
gion. This suggests that, from an environmental damages perspective, it would be as beneficial 
to allocate all electricity generation to the region with higher environmental damages as to the 
region with lower environmental damages. This hypothesis seems rather unlikely for the case of 
environmental damages from RES electricity generation. 
Our model is characterized by a cost-minimization framework. This is a realistic set up because 
many countries draw on quantity or percentage targets for RES development in the course of 
transitioning electricity generation from conventional to renewable resources (IRENA, 2020). We 
analyse how these targets can be met at minimal social cost of renewable electricity generation. 
We thus suggest that RES electricity generation targets are exogenously defined, e.g. by political 
decision-makers. However, this assumption neglects the fact that the socially optimal aggregate 
level of electricity generation could be determined endogenously by weighing the costs and ben­
efits (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions reductions) of RES deployment. In this case, aggregate 
electricity generation may differ between a spatially-differentiated and spatially-uniform instru­
ment. Because a uniform regulation remains inefficient in the presence of spatially-heterogeneous 
environmental externalities, RES deployment with this instrument design results in higher social 
costs. Thus, the corresponding aggregate level of electricity generation will be lower than with a 
spatially-differentiated regulation. Furthermore, the level of a uniform subsidy in a cost-benefit 
framework depends on environmental damage parameters and cumulative effects in addition to 
generation cost parameters. Assessing the impact of cumulative environmental effects on the 
welfare differential between the two regulatory designs in this setup is more complex and should 
be conducted in a separate analysis. 
Finally, the model is limited by the number of regions and environmental externalities consid­







ered. RES development certainly takes place in more than two regions. In the model, this 
can be reflected by including n regions, with n representing any positive integer. Similarly, 
it may be assumed that RES electricity generation causes multiple environmental externalities 
that are relevant at a spatial scale (Zerrahn, 2017). More externalities might be accompanied 
by additional cumulative effects on the environment. Furthermore, increased deployment of 
RES in the electricity sector entails additional costs to the power system, such as expenses 
linked to the provision of distribution or transmission networks or balancing services. These 
system integration costs emerge on top of RES electricity generation costs and may also feature 
spatial components (Hirth et al., 2015). Besides, grid infrastructure is often associated with 
environmental externalities as well (Devine-Wright and Batel, 2013; Pérez-Garćıa et al., 2017). 
Considering these additional regions, externalities and system elements is important, yet, it also 
complicates the analysis by adding to the spatial components determining the optimal allocation 
of RES electricity generation infrastructure across regions. Thus, designing a socially-optimal 
spatially-differentiated instrument is even more challenging in practice. Potential transaction or 
administrative costs associated with a spatially-differentiated instrument are likely to increase, 
such that the welfare gains of a spatially-differentiated instrument as opposed to a spatially­
uniform regulation are even more difficult to determine. 
7 Conclusion 
The expansion of electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES) is vital for the 
achievement of climate targets, such as the aims of the Paris Agreement. Especially wind power 
onshore and open-space photovoltaic systems are main contributors to electricity generation 
from RES. However, these technologies are also associated with local or regional environmental 
externalities. The level of these externalities differs between regions or locations. Moreover, 
these externalities may be subject to interregional cumulative effects. That is, marginal envi­
ronmental damages from regional electricity generation also depend on electricity generation in 
another region. As a result, aggregate environmental damages from RES electricity generation 
are higher or lower than the sum of environmental damages from regional electricity generation. 
Based on these environmental effects from RES deployment, we compare the outcomes of a 
spatially-differentiated and spatially-uniform policy to govern the deployment of RES electricity 
generation. We assessed the welfare differential between the two regulatory designs, and how 
the presence of cumulative environmental effects alters it both, theoretically and by employing 
a numerical example. 
The results of our model indicate that in the presence of cumulative environmental effects 
and spatially-heterogeneous environmental damages, a spatially-differentiated instrument de­
sign always welfare-dominates a spatially-uniform regulation. To optimally design a spatially­
differentiated policy, it is essential to understand the characteristics of cumulative environmental 
effects. 
The presence of cumulative environmental effects may both increase or reduce the welfare differ­
ential between a spatially-differentiated and a uniform regulation. This depends on the regional 
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distribution of generation cost parameters and social cost parameters of electricity generation 
and on the sign and size of cumulative effects. If the heterogeneity in generation cost parameters 
is stronger (weaker) than in social cost parameters, positive (negative) cumulative environmen­
tal effects may decrease the welfare differential of a spatially-uniform instrument. However, 
negative (positive) cumulative effects raise the welfare differential. 
While a spatially-differentiated instrument can implement the socially-optimal regional alloca­
tion of RES electricity generation, it is usually associated with higher transaction costs, such as 
administrative or informational burdens, than a spatially-uniform instrument. If the presence 
of cumulative environmental effects reduces the welfare deficit of a spatially-uniform instrument 
sufficiently, it may be optimal to implement the uniform instrument instead. However, to assess 
whether this is the case, the regulator needs to be informed about the heterogeneity in genera­
tion costs and regional environmental damages as well as about the sign and size of cumulative 
environmental effects. Nevertheless, if the regulator possesses this knowledge, administrative 
hurdles of implementing a spatially-differentiated instrument might diminish. 
These high informational requirements for optimal policy design might reveal avenues for future 
research. Although the deployment of RES has been proceeding for more than two decades in 
many European countries, the availability of data on the heterogeneity of region-specific envi­
ronmental damages is still rather limited. The importance of cumulative environmental effects 
is a more recent topic due to the fact that these effects depend on and grow with the deployment 
of RES technologies across several regions. As a result, knowledge on cumulative effects on the 
environment is even more scarce. Therefore, analysing how uncertainty regarding region-specific 
environmental damages and cumulative effects shapes optimal instrument design can contribute 
to a more comprehensive understanding of the welfare implications of different regulatory choices 
for the deployment of RES technologies. 
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Appendix A	 Socially optimal spatial allocation of RES electric­
ity generation 
The first-best spatial allocation of electricity generation is determined by minimising the social 
¯costs of electricity generation subject to the generation target restriction X: 
¯min SC = Ci(xi) + Cj (xj ) + D(xi, xj ) s.t. xi + xj ≥ X, 
xi,xj 
xi, xj ≥ 0 
Since electricity generation in our framework is only associated with costs (generation costs 
and environmental damages), there is no incentive to generate more electricity than required 
by the target. Therefore, the quantity constraint for the generation target is binding. The 
corresponding Lagrangian is subsequently differentiated with respect to xi, xj and λ:  
  
di djci cj 
i + j + i + 2 2 2 2 
222 x
2 −kx λ+ xi jj X̄
L =



















X̄= xi + xj − (34)
 
Solving (32) and (33) for λ and equating them reaches: 
(ci + di)xi + kxj = (cj + dj )xj + kxi (35) 
In the social optimum, marginal social costs from RES electricity generation are equal across 
regions. Solving (35) for xj and inserting into (34) delivers the socially optimal allocation levels 
∗ ∗ xi , x for an inner solution: j
 
(cj + dj − k)X̄ (ci + di − k)X̄
∗	 ∗ x =	 , x = i (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) j (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) 
The bordered Hessian matrix for the optimization problem is represented by HL: ⎞⎛ 
ci + di k −1 




k cj + dj −1 
−1 −1 0 
∗ ∗For the matrix, the partial derivatives of the Lagrange function are evaluated at the point (xi , x j ) 
∗ ∗and λ∗ . The allocation xi , x j represents a local minimum of the social welfare function (3) if: 
∗ ∗ − det(HL(λ ∗ , x i , x j )) > 0 
− (k(−1)(−1) + (−1)k(−1) − (−1)(cj + dj )(−1) − (−1)(−1)(ci + di)) > 0 
− (2k − (cj + d) − (ci + di)) > 0 
2k − (ci + di + cj + dj ) < 0 
ci + di + cj + dj




   
            
    




∗ ∗The spatial allocation of electricity generation xi , x only represents a local minimum of the j 
social cost function if cumulative effects are smaller than α. Otherwise, they mark a local
 
maximum of the social cost function.
 
By further determining the sign of the leading principal minors of the Hessian, another restriction
 
for k is identified:
 
Second order leading principal minor: D2 =
     
(ci + di) k k (cj + dj )
     
=
 
= (ci + di)(cj + dj ) − k2 > 0   
− (ci + di)(cj + dj ) < k < (ci + di)(cj + dj ) _

β 
(37)    (ci + di) = (ci + di) > 0   
The first-order principal minor of the Hessian D1 is always positive because ci, di > 0. The 
second order principal minor D2 is only positive if −β < k < β (37). 
Appendix B First-best spatially-differentiated subsidy 
The first-best spatially-differentiated subsidy is derived by inserting xi(si), xj (sj ) from (7) into 
the social cost function (4) and by subsequently minimizing with respect to si, sj while consid­
ering the quantity restrictions: 
ci si sj 2 si 2 sj 2 sj2 cj	 djdi	 si
min SC = + + + + k 
si,sj 2 ci 2 cj 2 ci 2 cj ci cj 
si sj
s.t.	 + ≥ X̄
ci cj 
si sj 
, ≥ 0 
ci cj 
The corresponding Lagrangian reads as follows: 
2 2 2 2ci si cj sj di si dj sj si sj si sjL = + + + + k − λ + − X̄
2 ci 2 cj 2 ci 2 cj ci cj ci cj 
∂L di k !
= si 1 + + sj − λ = 0	 (38)
∂si ci cj
 
∂L dj k !

= sj 1 + + si − λ = 0	 (39)
∂sj cj ci
 
∂L si sj !
¯= X − − = 0	 (40)
∂λ ci cj 
Solving (38) and (39) for λ and equating them delivers sj (si). Inserting sj (si) into (40) reaches 
the first-best spatially-differentiated subsidy levels: 
¯	 ¯Xci(cj + dj − k)	 Xcj (ci + di − k)∗	 ∗ si = (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)
, sj = (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k) 
i = j 




         
      
   
   
Appendix C	 Effect of cumulative environmental effects on the 
welfare differential between a spatially-uniform and 
spatially-differentiated subsidy 
In the following, the impact of cumulative environmental effects k on the welfare differential 
between a spatially-uniform and a spatially-differentiated regulation is computed. First, the 
direct and indirect impacts of k on ΔSC are identified: 
ΔSC = SCU − SC ∗ =
 
ci + di 2 cj + dj 2
U ∗	 U ∗ U U ∗ ∗ = x − xi (k)
2 + x − xj (k)
2 + k xi x − xi (k)xj (k)i	 j j2 _ 2 _ _
Indirect Indirect	 Direct and 
effect region i	 effect region j indirect effect 
(41) 
The direct effect of k on the welfare costs of a uniform regulation is represented in the last 
multiplicative term of (41), while the indirect effect is present in every term via the quantities 
∗ xi (k). The marginal effect of a change in k on ΔSC is derived by taking the total derivative of 
(41): 













∂ΔSC	 ∂x∗ ∂x∗ ∗ i	 ∗ i U U ∗ ∗ = −(ci + di − k)x + (cj + dj − k)x + xi x − xi x (43)i	 j j j∂k ∂k ∂k 
The first two additive terms in (43) offset each other, such that the impact of k on ΔSC is 
U U ∗ ∗represented by the direct effect (xi x − xi x ) only. This can be seen more clearly by inserting j j 
∗ ∗ xi , x into (43): j 
∂ΔSC kX̄2(ci + di − cj − dj )2 kX̄2(ci + di − cj − dj )2 
= −	 + 
∂k ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)3 ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)3 _ 
=0 
¯ ¯cicj X
2 X2(ci + di − k)(cj + dj − k)
+ −	 (44)
(ci + cj )2 (ci + di + cj + dj − 2k)2 _ 
xUi x
U
j −x ∗ ∗ i xj 
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Appendix D Calibrated model: Generation cost and environ­
mental damage parameters per federal state 
Federal state (abbreviation) c1i i = 1, ..., 12 c2i i = 1, ..., 12 di i = 1, ..., 12 
Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW) 0, 062 1, 84705 10−12 8, 93010 10−12 
Bavaria (BY) 0, 052 1, 33494 10−12 4, 57779 10−12 
Brandenburg (BB) 0, 046 2, 70273 10−13 4, 37312 10−13 
Hessia (HE) 0, 046 9, 58190 10−13 4, 03977 10−12 
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania (MV) 
0, 042 1, 41837 10−13 4, 29472 10−13 
Lower Saxony (NI) 0, 040 2, 12205 10−13 8, 40227 10−13 
North Rhine-Westphalia (NW) 0, 050 1, 53183 10−12 2, 10787 10−11 
Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) 0, 049 2, 52251 10−12 9, 35231 10−12 
Saxony (SN) 0, 049 1, 69078 10−13 7, 87437 10−13 
Saxony-Anhalt (ST) 0, 038 1, 15154 10−12 3, 96975 10−12 
Schleswig-Holstein (SH) 0, 041 6, 75146 10−13 3, 91271 10−12 
Thuringia (TH) 0, 046 7, 8735 10−13 3, 17155 10−12 
Table 3: Estimated coefficients for the generation cost function and the environmental damage cost function of 
onshore wind power deployment for the German federal states, except Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg and Saarland. 
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land: Ein Vergleich möglicher Strategien für den Ausbau von Wind- und Solarenergie in 





optimiert.pdf. Last accessed: 2021/03/16
 
Ambec, S. and J. Coria (2013). Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 66 (1), 123–140. 
Borenstein, S. (2012). The Private and Public Economics of Renewable Electricity Generation. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 26 (1), 67–92. 
Botelho, A., L. Lourenço-Gomes, L. Pinto, S. Sousa, and M. Valente (2017). Accounting for 
local impacts of photovoltaic farms: The application of two stated preferences approaches to 
a case-study in Portugal. Energy Policy 109, 191–198. 
Caplan, A. J. (2006). A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling 
Correlated Externalities. Environmental and Resource Economics 34 (4), 471–492. 
Coggan, A., S. M. Whitten, and J. Bennett (2010). Influences of transaction costs in environ­
mental policy. Ecological Economics 69 (9), 1777–1784. 
Crago, C. L. and J. K. Stranlund (2015). Optimal regulation of carbon and co-pollutants with 
spatially differentiated damages. mimeo. 
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/205594/files/Crago%20Stranlund%20June% 
202015.pdf. Last accessed: 2021/03/16 
Dahl, E. L., K. Bevanger, T. Nyg̊ard, E. Røskaft, and B. G. Stokke (2012). Reduced breeding 
success in white-tailed eagles at Smøla windfarm, western Norway, is caused by mortality and 
displacement. Biological Conservation 145 (1), 79–85. 
Dai, K., A. Bergot, C. Liang, W.-N. Xiang, and Z. Huang (2015). Environmental issues associ­
ated with wind energy – A review. Renewable Energy 75, 911–921. 
del Ŕıo, P. (2017). Designing auctions for renewable electricity support. Best practices from 
around the world. Energy for Sustainable Development 41, 1–13. 
Deutsche WindGuard GmbH (2020). Status des Windenergieausbaus an Land in Deutschland: 
Erstes Halbjahr 2020. 
https://www.windguard.de/veroeffentlichungen.html?file=files/cto_layout/img/ 
unternehmen/veroeffentlichungen/2020/Status%20des%20Windenergieausbaus%20an% 
20Land%20-%20Halbjahr%202020.pdf. Last accessed 2021/03/16 
39
 
Devine-Wright, P. and S. Batel (2013). Explaining public preferences for high voltage pylon 
designs: An empirical study of perceived fit in a rural landscape. Land Use Policy 31, 640– 
649. 
Drechsler, M., J. Egerer, M. Lange, F. Masurowski, J. Meyerhoff, and M. Oehlmann (2017). 
Efficient and equitable spatial allocation of renewable power plants at the country scale. 
Nature Energy 2 (9), 17124. 
Drewitt, A. L. and R. H. Langston (2006). Assessing the impacts of wind farms on birds. 
Ibis 148 (s1), 29–42. 
EEG 2021 (2021). Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz vom 21. Juli 2014 (BGBl. I S. 1066), das zuletzt 
durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 21. Dezember 2020 (BGBl. I S. 3138) geändert worden ist. 
Evans, A., V. Strezov, and T. J. Evans (2009). Assessment of sustainability indicators for 
renewable energy technologies. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 13 (5), 1082–1088. 
Fehr, E., M. Naef, and K. M. Schmidt (2006). Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Pref­
erences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment. American Economic Review 96 (5), 
1912–1917. 
Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3), 817–868. 
Fowlie, M. and N. Muller (2019). Market-Based Emissions Regulation When Damages Vary 
across Sources: What Are the Gains from Differentiation? Journal of the Association of 
Environmental and Resource Economists 6 (3), 593–632. 
Gill, J. A., K. Norris, and W. J. Sutherland (2001). Why behavioural responses may not reflect 
the population consequences of human disturbance. Biological Conservation 97 (2), 265–268. 
Hirth, L., F. Ueckerdt, and O. Edenhofer (2015). Integration costs revisited – An economic 
framework for wind and solar variability. Renewable Energy 74, 925–939. 
Hötker, H., K.-M. Thomsen, and H. Jeromin (2006). Impacts on biodiversity of exploitation of 
renewable energy sources: the example of birds and bats: Facts, gaps in knowledge, demands 
for further research, and onithological guidelines for the development of renewabe energy ex­
ploitation. Bergenhusen. 
IRENA (2020). Global Renewables Outlook: Energy transformation 2050: (Edition: 2020). 
International Renewable Energy Agency. Abu Dhabi. 
https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2020/Apr/IRENA_ 
Global_Renewables_Outlook_2020.pdf. Last accessed:2021/03/16 
Jenkins, K., D. McCauley, R. Heffron, H. Stephan, and R. Rehner (2016). Energy justice: A 
conceptual review. Energy Research & Social Science 11, 174–182. 
Kolstad, C. D. (1987). Uniformity versus differentiation in regulating externalities. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 14 (4), 386–399. 
40
 
Kost, C., S. Shammugam, V. Jülch, H.-T. Nguyen, and T. Schlegl (2018). Studie: Stromgeste­




Langer, K., T. Decker, J. Roosen, and K. Menrad (2016). A qualitative analysis to understand 
the acceptance of wind energy in Bavaria. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 64, 
248–259. 
Lehmann, P. (2012). Justifying A Policy Mix For Pollution Control: A Review Of Economic 
Literature. Journal of Economic Surveys 26 (1), 71–97. 
Lehmann, P. (2013). Supplementing an emissions tax by a feed-in tariff for renewable electricity 
to address learning spillovers. Energy Policy 61, 635–641. 
Lehmann, P., K. Ammermann, E. Gawel, C. Geiger, J. Hauck, J. Heilmann, J.-N. Meier, 
J. Ponitka, S. Schicketanz, B. Stemmer, P. Tafarte, D. Thrän, and E. Wolfram (2020). Man­
aging spatial sustainability trade-offs: The case of wind power. UFZ Discussion Papers (No. 
4/2020). 
Masden, E. A., A. D. Fox, R. W. Furness, R. Bullman, and D. T. Haydon (2010). Cumulative 
impact assessments and bird-wind farm interactions: Developing a conceptual framework. 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review 30 (1), 1–7. 
Masurowski, F., M. Drechsler, and K. Frank (2016). A spatially explicit assessment of the wind 
energy potential in response to an increased distance between wind turbines and settlements 
in Germany. Energy Policy 97, 343–350. 
Mattmann, M., I. Logar, and R. Brouwer (2016). Wind power externalities: A meta-analysis. 
Ecological Economics 127, 23–36. 
May, R., E. A. Masden, F. Bennet, and M. Perron (2019). Considerations for upscaling individual 
effects of wind energy development towards population-level impacts on wildlife. Journal of 
environmental management 230, 84–93. 
Meier, J.-N. and P. Lehmann (2020). Optimal federal co-regulation of renewable energy deploy­
ment. UFZ Discussion Papers (8/2020). 
Meyerhoff, J., C. Ohl, and V. Hartje (2010). Landscape externalities from onshore wind power. 
Energy Policy 38 (1), 82–92. 
Molnarova, K., P. Sklenicka, J. Stiborek, K. Svobodova, and M. Salek (2012). Visual preferences 




Moslener, U. and T. Requate (2007). Optimal abatement in dynamic multi-pollutant problems 
when pollutants can be complements or substitutes. Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control 31 (7), 2293–2316. 
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